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ABSTRACT.  Lewis has recently argued that Maudlin’s contingent absorber experiment remains 
a significant problem for the Transactional Interpretation (TI).  He argues that the only 
straightforward way to resolve the challenge is by describing the absorbers as offer waves, and 
asserts that this is a previously unnoticed aspect of the challenge for TI. This argument is refuted 
in two basic ways: (i) it is noted that the Maudlin experiment cannot be meaningfully recast with 
absorbers described by quantum states and (ii) the extant rebuttals to the Maudlin challenge in its 
original form are not in fact subject to the alleged flaws that Lewis ascribes to them. This paper 
further seeks to clarify the issues raised in Lewis’ presentation concerning the distinction 
between quantum systems and macroscopic objects in TI. It is concluded that the Maudlin 
challenge poses no significant problem for the transactional interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction and Background 
 
 In Lewis (2013), the author argues that the consistency of the Transactional Interpretation 
of quantum mechanics (TI) continues to face a significant threat from Maudlin’s contingent 
absorber experiment (2002). While the author’s interest in TI and related issues is very welcome, 
his discussion unfortunately contains quite a few errors and misconceptions. This paper will 
attempt to clarify some of these issues and to point out that the perception of a problem arises 
from apparent misunderstandings about TI, especially of its recent development in Kastner 
(2012a,b).  In particular, the author’s arguments do not take proper account of the current status 
of TI as an interpretation that has been fully extended into the relativistic domain, and which has 
clearly defined criteria for which systems can be considered offer waves and which cannot.  
 
 Maudlin developed his thought experiment as a specific challenge for John Cramer’s 
original formulation of TI (Cramer 1986).  Figure 1 illustrates the basic setup.  
 
Figure 1: The Maudlin Experiment 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, a source emits massive (and therefore, Maudlin assumes, slow-
moving) particles either to the left or right, in the state  [ ]LR +=Ψ
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, a superposition of  
‘rightward’ and ‘leftward’ -propagating states. Offer wave components corresponding to right 
and left are emitted in both directions, but, in Maudlin’s arrangement, only detector A can 
initially return a confirmation wave (since B is blocked by A). If the particle is not detected at A 
(meaning that the rightward transaction failed), a light signal is immediately sent to detector B, 
causing it to swing quickly around to intercept the particle on the left.  B then is able to return a 
confirmation wave of amplitude 
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. At this point, the particle is certain to be detected there, so 
Maudlin claims that the confirmation wave’s amplitude of less than unity is evidence of 
inconsistency on the part of TI.  
 Maudlin’s inconsistency claim has been rebutted by Kastner (2006, 2012b, Chapter 5) 
and Marchildon (2006) and Boisvert and Marchildon (2013).  Lewis takes issue with these 
rebuttals, and argues that the only ‘straightforward’ way to resolve the challenge is to treat the 
absorbers as quantum systems. However, this approach fails to establish the author’s claims; 
specific reasons will be discussed below.  In addition, TI has been developed and elaborated by 
Kastner (2012a,b, 2014) into a fully relativistic interpretation with a possibilist ontology, the 
‘possibilist transactional interpretation’ (PTI).  This development makes much of Lewis’s 
argumentation irrelevant. The irrelevant aspects depend on a misapplication of the transactional 
picture, in particular the assignment of offer waves (quantum states) to macroscopic objects that 
are not offer waves. In addition, the author characterizes the treatment of macroscopic objects in 
TI as ‘murky,’ while in fact this issue is disambiguated in Kastner (2012b, Chapters 6 and 7). In 
view of apparent ongoing confusion surrounding these issues, I will attempt to clarify that 
treatment of macroscopic objects here, with further details in Section 3.  
 In PTI, macroscopic emitters and absorbers are unambiguously defined in terms of their 
constituent microscopic field currents, which are capable of coupling to other fields. This 
coupling is characterized by an amplitude, the coupling amplitude, which is the amplitude for 
emission or absorption of another field, as in the emission of a photon by an electron. The value 
of the coupling amplitude for electrons and photons is the square root of the fine structure 
constant of quantum electrodynamics (the charge of the electron in natural units). A macroscopic 
emitter is a system composed of large enough numbers of microscopic emitting currents (e.g. 
excited electrons) such that the probability of emission of an offer by at least one of the 
microscopic currents constituting the object is virtually unity. The same definition holds for 
absorption: a macroscopic absorber, such as a detector in an experiment, is a system composed 
of large enough numbers of microscopic absorbing currents (e.g. ground state electrons) such 
that the probability of generation of a confirmation by at least one of the currents is virtually 
unity. This is discussed in detail in  Kastner (2012a, §5), including a representative computation 
of the probability of generation of a confirmation by at least one of the constituent microscopic 
currents in a macroscopic sample.  
 The preceding sort of system is the only kind of absorber that instantiates the Maudlin 
contingent absorber experiment. An absorber cannot be represented by an offer wave undergoing 
unitary evolution, because the absorber constituting the Maudlin experiment always generates a 
confirmation and accompanying non-unitary collapse with a specific empirical measurement 
result. That is what makes it a contingent absorber experiment.  
 
2. Lewis alternative experiments are not contingent absorber experiments 
 
 As noted above, much of the author’s discussion concerns an alleged ambiguity of the 
applicability of the transactional picture to macroscopic objects. This issue he identifies as a 
second ‘unnoticed’ aspect of the Maudlin challenge (the first being the alleged inconsistency of 
the probability for detection at absorber B). However, PTI is unambiguous about what counts as 
a macroscopic object (and is decidedly not an offer wave) and what counts as a microscopic 
object (which could be described by an offer wave or at least as a bound state describable to a 
good approximation by a quantum state). Perhaps due to a misunderstanding of this work, the 
author presents two ‘alternative’ versions of the Maudlin experiment that misapply the 
transactional picture. In one of these, a quantum system, an antiparticle, is mis-identified as an 
absorber; while in the other, allegedly macroscopic absorbers are assumed to be describable as 
offer waves. Rather than elucidate an ‘overlooked’ aspect of the Maudlin challenge as the author 
claims, these scenarios unfortunately create confusion both about the Maudlin experiment and 
about TI.  
 Specifically, in eqs . (1) and (2) the author proposes an antiparticle offer wave as an 
absorber for a particle offer wave. (I assume that examples of the proposed particles would be an 
electron and a positron.)  However, an antiparticle offer wave cannot be an absorber for a particle 
offer wave. An offer wave of a given field, such as the Fermi-Dirac field for fermions, does not 
couple to other offer waves of the same field, and therefore does not constitute an absorber for 
offer waves of the same field. Of course, a fermion offer wave may be indirectly detected by 
another fermion, for example in the case of a bound electron being excited by another 
approaching electron due to the transactional exchange of a photon. In that case, however, there 
is an actualized transaction and nonunitary collapse, and the evolution is not unitary as in the 
author’s alternative versions. 
 In addition, it is not the case that a confirmation wave is sent “from the point at which the 
particle and antiparticle annihilate” (Lewis 2013, discussion under eqn. (2)). Ordinary relativistic 
quantum theory treats the interaction between the particle and antiparticle offer waves as a 
scattering process, as does TI, especially in Kastner’s updated version (Kastner 2012b, §6.3). A 
process in which an incoming particle and antiparticle offer undergo scattering has a well-
defined amplitude (less than unity) for annihilation, in which the outgoing states are two photons. 
Even if we ignore that and pretend (in a nonrelativistic approximation) that the amplitude for 
annihilation is unity, there is certainly no confirmation sent from that interaction stage.  Those 
outgoing photons are just offer waves, so no confirmation is sent from the location of the 
interaction as claimed. Rather, the only information one could have concerning ‘which way’ the 
particle went is by way of photon confirmations sent from fixed, macroscopic photon detectors. 
 While these corrections perhaps do not nullify the intent of the author’s alternative 
experiment, which is to describe the moveable absorber (B) by an offer wave, his proposed 
experiment fails to capture the contingent absorber features of the Maudlin challenge. The 
antiparticle is not really an absorber, and the absorbers actually generating the confirmations are 
fixed. Thus the translation of the Maudlin challenge into a ‘quantum mechanical’ form makes it 
vacuous, rather than offering a ‘straightforward solution’ to the problem as the author contends.  
Of course, there is no challenge, and the situation is perfectly describable in TI, but this is not a 
contingent absorber experiment. Nor does this argument demonstrate that nullifying the 
experiment is the only way to resolve the puzzle presented by the experiment in its non-nullified, 
original form. The same basic point applies to the second alternative version in which quantum 
states representing offer waves are erroneously assigned to macroscopic absorbers. This second 
version will be discussed further below. 
 
3. Macroscopic objects well-defined in PTI 
 
 It has been objected in the past that a ‘macroscopic object’ is an allegedly ill-defined or 
problematic concept in TI: this may once have been the case, but it is long past the time that this 
criticism was a fair one. The concept of an absorber as a macroscopic object is discussed in detail 
in Kastner (2012a, section 5). As noted above, absorbers are defined in terms of coupling 
amplitudes, which are naturally interpreted in a direct-action theory (such as the Wheeler-
Feynman (1945, 1949) and Davies (1971, 1972) theories upon which TI is based) as the 
amplitudes for both the emission of offer waves and the generation of confirmations.
1
 A 
macroscopic absorber, such as Maudlin’s detectors A and B, is a system in which the amplitude 
for the generation of a confirmation by at least any one of its constituent coupling microscopic 
currents approaches unity. A macroscopic absorber is virtually guaranteed to generate a 
confirmation due to its composition by large numbers of microscopic currents capable of 
                                                 
1
 Feynman himself noted that the coupling amplitude for QED is the amplitude for a real photon to be emitted or 
absorbed (Feynman 1985). In a direct-action picture such as that of Wheeler-Feynman (1945, 1949)  or Davies 
(1971, 1972), upon which TI is based, this is the amplitude for emission of an offer wave or for generation of a 
confirmation wave. 
coupling to a given offer wave. Similarly, a macroscopic emitter (such as a laser) is virtually 
guaranteed to generate offer waves.  
 Upon the actualization of a transaction, both the emitter and the absorber are localized 
and are therefore macroscopic, spacetime events. Therefore, such an object is never accurately 
described by a quantum state (offer wave), since it is continually being localized due to ongoing 
emission or absorption, and collapse. In contrast, offer waves are nonlocal objects, since they are 
field excitations.
2
 This is how PTI naturally demonstrates the emergence of a classical, 
macroscopic realm from a domain of quantum possibilities. Since it is the macroscopic, 
collapsing kind of absorber that creates the Maudlin challenge in the first place, the situation 
discussed in equations (4) and (5) in which macroscopic absorbers are erroneously described by 
offer waves, fails both as a version of Maudlin’s challenge and as an application of TI. 
 The author unfortunately creates further confusion about TI’s treatment of macroscopic 
objects in the following statement: “The worry about incorporating macroscopic objects into a 
TI-style analysis is that it opens the door for macroscopic objects to have indeterminate 
trajectories.”  This is certainly not the case, and alleging such a ‘worry’ again ignores the recent 
literature on TI.  In fact, it is never appropriate to describe macroscopic systems – by which we 
mean systems composed of enough microscopic currents to generate either offers or 
confirmations with certainty -- by quantum states.  This is because quantum states only apply to 
systems that are either excited states of fields (offer waves) or quantum bound states with very 
small amplitudes (i.e. of the order of the fine structure constant) of emitting offers or generating 
confirmations. In contrast, as noted above, macroscopic objects are always localized by ongoing 
actualized transactions. That is how the existence of macroscopic objects is explained in PTI – 
they are continually undergoing collapse that localizes them in spacetime, so they can’t have 
indeterminate spacetime trajectories.
3
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 This may seem to indicate a ‘preferred observable’ in that conserved quantities such as energy and momentum are 
actualized and transferred in transactions. This is a natural reflection of the fact that position is not an observable in 
relativistic quantum theory, which is the more accurate theory. Nonrelativistic quantum theory, which treats position 
as an observable, is only an approximation, and should never be viewed as a free-standing theory. It is through 
actualized transactions that objects become localized – spacetime is just the arena of actualized transactions, and 
spacetime events are actualized emission and absorption events. We never really ‘observe’ position. We simply 
participate in transactions that transfer conserved physical quantities between our sense organs and other objects. 
3
 One can assign an ‘effective quantum state’ to a macroscopic object, but only as a kind of correspondence 
principle, e.g., by ascribing to it a center-of-mass position state with so little uncertainty that it can be regarded as 
having a determinate position. However, in general, macroscopic objects are conglomerates of actualized 
transactions, and therefore are not quantum objects. In any case, such a system is certainly not an offer wave. 
 Thus, neither the antiparticle nor the putative ‘quantum absorbers’ function as real  
absorbers  in the author’s proposed alternative version of the Maudlin experiment. By definition, 
an ‘absorber’ in TI is a macroscopic object that generates confirmations with certainty, and that 
always results in collapse,  a nonunitary process. However, the author’s reworking of the 
experiment with quantum states for the detectors A and B describes the entire process as unitary; 
thus the ‘absorbers’ are not really absorbers. The whole point of the Maudlin challenge is as a 
contingent absorber experiment. But in the author’s versions, the generation of a confirmation 
wave is not contingent on anything, since all the relevant detectors are fixed. These are the 
photon detectors overlooked in the author’s first version, and unspecified other fixed detectors 
bringing about the ‘destruction’ of the particles putatively comprising the detectors A and B in 
his second version. So the author fails to construct a ‘quantum’ version of the Maudlin 
experiment, and his arguments based on that premise fail as well.  
 
4. Criticism of Marchildon rebuttal fails 
 
 The author claims that the only ‘straightforward’ solution to the Maudlin experiment is 
by essentially treating all the objects as offer waves – which means, in view of our arguments 
above, to nullify the Maudlin experiment by changing it into something else entirely. Does this 
mean that the rebuttals of Kastner and Marchildon fail to resolve the challenge? No, because 
those rebuttals have apparently been misunderstood.  
 Let us begin with the author’s criticism of Marchildon’s solution (2006) , which is 
elaborated in Boisvert and Marchildon (2013). Marchildon notes that in the original conception 
of the Wheeler-Feynman direct-action theory, there is always absorption somewhere for any 
emitted offer wave; the universe is a ‘light-tight box’.
 4
  Thus Marchildon includes a remote, 
background absorber C, which always returns confirmations from the left side. (The left side is 
where the closer, moveable absorber B moves if the right-hand detector A does not fire.) This 
means that there are always confirmations from both the left and the right, and there are always 
two incipient transactions with probabilistic weights of ½, correctly reflecting the observed 
frequencies of detection on the right and the left. When detector A does not fire, it means that the 
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 Recall that the Wheeler-Feynman (1945, 1949) and Davies (1971, 1972) theories of the direct-action picture, upon 
which TI is based, are empirically equivalent to standard theories of fields if the universe is a ‘light-tight box’ or if 
other equivalent boundary conditions obtain -- an alternative BC is explored in Cramer (1983). 
particle is emitted to the left and is intercepted by B. The author presents Marchildon’s solution 
and comments: 
 
“Marchildon's account retains the inconsistency …. regarding absorber B; absorber B definitely receives 
the particle if it has a probability of 1/2 of doing so. Furthermore, his account adds a new inconsistency 
regarding absorber C; absorber C definitely does not receive the particle when it has a probability of 1/2 
of doing so. The contradiction at the heart of Maudlin's challenge remains.” (Lewis 2013) 
 
 No, the alleged contradiction does not remain. The mistake in the above argument is in 
ascribing the probabilities to detectors. The probabilities apply to the realization of the properties 
of the quantum being transferred, not to a particular detector. This is so because it is the 
confirmed field itself, not emitters or absorbers, which instantiates the physical probabilities. So 
for example, the photon offer wave component that reaches C is characterized by a particular 
energy and momentum. It does not matter whether that actualized photon is ultimately absorbed 
by the movable detector B or at C; it is the energy and momentum of the photon that is 
actualized, not ‘detection at B’ or ‘detection at C.’ Regardless of which detector ends up 
receiving the energy, the same photon, with the same energy and momentum, is detected. And it 
is detected (actualized) on the left with a probability of ½, meaning that half the time a photon 
with leftward momentum is actualized and half the time a photon with rightward momentum is 
actualized. Thus, there is no inconsistency.  
 The mistake in the author’s argument is in attributing probabilities to specific detectors, 
rather than to the entities actually described by the probabilities – the quanta being emitted and 
absorbed. This misconception is understandable, since standard applications of quantum theory 
routinely attribute the probabilities to detection sites for pragmatic purposes. But the 
probabilities themselves actually apply to the transfer of the physically conserved quantities 
described by the quantum states (energy, momentum, angular momentum, etc.)  So clearly, 
including a distant absorber resolves any apparent inconsistency concerning the physical 
meaning of the weights of the incipient transactions, which function as probabilities of 
actualization of those transactions. Whenever the rightward transaction is not actualized, the 
leftward one is, and they both have a probability of ½, and those are expressed in the observed 
frequencies of the respective outcomes. Claiming that there is any inconsistency here is either 
overstating the situation, or insisting on applying the probabilities to the wrong entities and 
processes. 
 
5. Criticism of Kastner rebuttal fails 
 
 It is clear from the above that Marchildon’s solution is a very straightforward one. 
However, it does depend explicitly on the ‘light tight box’ condition. Meanwhile, Kastner 
(2012b, Chapter 5), in considering the possibility of no distant absorber on the left side,
 5
  has 
pointed out that even in this case, Maudlin’s experiment presents no more inconsistency problem 
for TI than Wheeler’s ‘delayed choice experiment’ does for standard quantum theory (Wheeler, 
1978).  In a nutshell, that rebuttal points out that the delayed choice experiment presents a kind 
of causal loop that poses, for ordinary quantum theory,  an apparent probability inconsistency of 
precisely the same kind as the Maudlin experiment. The causal loop consists in the fact that, 
according to Wheeler’s own interpretational approach, the choice of an experimenter, at a time t2,   
whether to do a ‘which way’ or ‘both ways’ measurement exerts some causal influence on the 
past of a photon at a time t1<t2;  that is,  it affects whether the photon previously ‘went through 
both slits’ or ‘went through only one slit’. In the usual block world formulation, the future choice 
at t2 must therefore already be determined according to what the photon does at the slits at t1. 
This gives rise to an apparent causal loop of the same kind as the Maudlin challenge: given 
whatever the photon does at t1, the experimenter must choose the corresponding measurement at 
t2.  If one replaces the experimenter’s choice by a quantum coin flip with probabilities of ½ for 
each option, then the probabilities applying to the quantum coin flip are inconsistent.   
 To see this, suppose ‘heads’ instructs us to ‘measure which slit’ and ‘tails’ instructs us to 
‘measure both slits and get interference.’ Each time the coin flips (according to the block world 
picture), its outcome must already be decided by whatever the photon did before the coin flip. If 
the photon went through both slits, then it is certain that the coin will come up ‘tails,’ yet the 
quantum probability for that outcome is only ½. This is exactly the same alleged inconsistency 
that the Maudlin experiment presents, but clearly it has not been considered a fatal, or even 
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 Since direct-action theories require full absorption, or an equivalent boundary condition (such as a perfectly 
reflecting t=0 condition) for empirical equivalence with standard theories of radiation, any scenario lacking full 
absorption is speculative, and responses to the Maudlin challenge on those terms necessarily inherit that speculative 
quality.  
significant, problem for standard quantum theory. At most, it is an interesting puzzle, to the 
extent that it has even been noticed at all. 
 Lewis acknowledges this crucial argument, but fails to rebut it. Instead, he comments that 
standard quantum theory has unresolved conceptual problems, such as the measurement 
problem
6
, and argues that it should not be considered reassuring to be told that TI is no more 
threatened by the Maudlin challenge than standard quantum theory is by the delayed choice 
experiment.  But, as noted above, standard quantum theory is not at all threatened by the delayed 
choice experiment:  nobody has suggested that ‘quantum theory collapses’ because of this 
interesting puzzle about the probabilities in the delayed choice experiment. Nevertheless, in an 
attempt to support the notion that the delayed choice experiment presents a significant problem 
for standard quantum theory, the author claims that this was a motivation for John Cramer in 
developing TI, and invokes Cramer’s discussion (1986, p. 671) of that experiment. But this is 
misleading. In the cited section, Cramer was discussing how TI can provide an observer-free 
account of measurement, and pointing out that including the response of absorbers resolves the 
alleged involvement of a conscious observer in determining whether a photon retroactively went 
through one or both slits in the delayed choice experiment. Thus, clearly Cramer’s intent was to 
eliminate the conscious observer and to solve the measurement problem in physical terms, not to 
claim that the delayed choice experiment specifically posed a consistency problem for quantum 
theory .  
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 Of course, TI solves the measurement problem, so that isn’t a problem for quantum theory in TI. The author cites 
other interpretations that supposedly solve the measurement problem yet are not subject to Maudlin’s challenge: the 
Bohmian theory, Everettian (MWI) approaches, and the GRW theory. However, all these interpretations suffer from 
serious deficiencies not faced by TI, such as difficulty explaining the Born Rule, or what causes the frankly ad hoc 
‘collapses’ of the GRW approach. (Also, the status of GRW approaches as comprehensive interpretations capable of 
dealing with both nonrelativistic and relativistic realms is far from clear, and their alleged ‘resolution’ of the 
measurement problem is bought at the high price of changing quantum theory.) It is not even clear that the Bohmian 
theory does solve the measurement problem (see, e.g., Brown and Wallace 2005), so the author cannot take this for 
granted. In addition there is great difficulty in extending the Bohmian theory to the relativistic domain, while TI 
applies seamlessly to both the nonrelativistic and relativistic domains as shown in Kastner (2012a,b, 2014). 
Regarding MWI, Kent (1990) argues that “no plausible set of axioms exists for an MWI that describes known 
physics.” He extends his critique in a more recent publication (2010), concluding that  “…no known version of the 
theory (unadorned by extra ad hoc postulates) can account for the appearance of probabilities and explain why the 
theory it was meant to replace, Copenhagen quantum theory, appears to be confirmed, or more generally why our 
evolutionary history appears to be Born-rule typical” (Kent 2010) So it is far from established that the alternative 
interpretations cited by the author succeed in resolving the measurement problem or other challenges in 
understanding quantum theory. 
 
 In view of the author’s invocation of Cramer in this context, it is especially surprising 
that in the same paper the author alleges that TI can be viewed as similar to the Copenhagen 
Interpretation (CI). These two interpretations – TI and CI -- could scarcely be more different.  
Indeed, Cramer (1986) takes great pains to contrast TI with CI, and presents TI as a better 
approach which clearly defines the measurement process rather than taking macroscopic objects 
as primitive and relying on the intentions and behaviors of conscious observers to define 
measurement, as in CI. It is thus quite inaccurate to suggest that TI has anything in common with 
CI. 
  
6. Conclusion: Maudlin challenge has been decisively refuted 
 
 While the author’s interest in TI is certainly welcome, it has been shown that his 
arguments fail to establish an ongoing significant problem for TI due to the Maudlin experiment. 
In several instances the author’s arguments mischaracterize and/or misapply the transactional 
picture, and his alternative version of the Maudlin experiment are not in fact contingent absorber 
experiments.  An attempt has been made herein to clarify issues that have been subject to 
apparent confusion, especially the treatment of macroscopic objects in the latest incarnation of 
the transactional picture, PTI. Macroscopic emitters and absorbers are unambiguously defined in 
PTI, and cannot usefully be described by quantum states, since they are continually undergoing 
collapse and attendant spacetime localization. Thus such objects cannot have indeterminate 
trajectories as suggested by the author, nor can they be treated as offer waves.  In addition, 
rebuttals of the Maudlin challenge by Marchildon and Kastner have been shown to be perfectly 
effective when correctly understood. Thus Maudlin’s challenge has been effectively disarmed, 
and no longer presents a significant problem for the transactional interpretation. 
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